tain Banks in the Valley, and to recall to the Valley those of Banks's troops which had begun to move towards Manassas, owing to a daring, though unsuccessful, attack which Jackson had made on Shields^ division at Kernstown, near Winchester.

But even with this modification of Iris original o scheme, he proposed to leave under General Abercrombie 18,689 men at Manassas and Warrenton, so that, if the enemy should march on Washington, and these troops should be obliged to fall back to the Capital, the force there would be increased to 36,639 men.[1] This, however, could be true only on the supposition that Abercrombie's troops, if driven from Warrenton and Manassas, would be able to effect an orderly retreat to the lines of Washington; and whether they would or would not be able to do this, no one, of course, could say in advance. It is too plain for argument that arrangements,—or perhaps we should Bay, hopeful expectations,—of this description were not what was intended or ordered by the Government. There is here a clear case of an attempt to evade the performance of the task which General McClellan was in duty bound to carry out. The understanding was, that Washington and the works surrounding it should have

a garrison of some 36,000 men,—troops capable of performing the duties of such a position,—and from whom no other duties were to be expected. They were to be in ami about Washington, under tlie command of the Military Governor of the District of Columbia; and

[1] McCtellim'a O. SM 240, 241. Of these 18,639 men, however, 3500 had not yet left Pennsylvania !